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Corporate Manslaughter: New Horizon or 
False Dawn? 
Update:  
The Prosecution of Lion Steel 
 
 
Simon Daniels 
 
 
In Corporate Manslaughter: New Horizon of False Dawn? the author 
concluded with a somewhat melodramatic cliff-hanger as we awaited the 
WULDORI/LRQ6WHHO(TXLSPHQW/WGµ/6¶,Q-XO\-XGJH*LOEDUW4&
Honorary Recorder of Manchester, published his remarks on sentencing in 
the trial1 and, so, this paper becomes an essential sequel to the former, in 
which we analyse what progress if any can be said to have been achieved in 
the development of the current law in corporate accountability. 
With the thoroughness perhaps not altogether ubiquitous in Crown 
Court proceedings, it has been extremely helpful that the judge should have 
addressed his sentencing remarks in the case with meticulous care, although 
he did not necessarily do so for the reason of divining the emergent law but 
for the purpose of clarifying his decision on a submission on the 
admissibility of evidence under that law, as will be seen.  
Lion Steel (LS) manufactures and distributes storage equipment from 
two factories. At its Hyde, Manchester premises, it employed Steven Berry 
who ± in 2008 ± fell through a rooflight to his death.  Ever since the Crown 
had failed to secure a conviction against P & O Ferries for the Herald of Free 
Enterprise disaster2, the normative ethics of society had been demanding 
new legislation that would sweep away the frailties in the common law and 
punish companies for criminal mismanagement that had led to fatal 
accidents. There had been a successful prosecution in England and Wales 
under the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 in the 
                                                          
1
 R v Lion Steel Equipment Ltd, Manchester Crown Court, 20 July 2012 (currently unreported). For the full 
sentencing remarks with ruling annexed see: 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgments/hhj-gilbart-qc-sentence-remarksr-v-lion-
steel.pdf 
 
2
 R v P & O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd [1991] 93 Cr App R 72. 
 
case against Cotswold Geotechnical Holdings3 but, in fairness, this company 
had been so small that the old common law offence, demanding, as it did, a 
causal link between the criminal act and the controlling mind, would 
probably have been just as effective4.  LS was described by the Trial Judge 
DVEHLQJµQRWDODUJHILUP¶ZLWKDWXUQover exceeding £10 million per annum 
and a workforce of 142 employees, the anticipation, however, lay in the fact 
that here, at last, was a company which was large enough to test the 
capability of the 2007 Act in corporate accountability, and succeed where 
the common law had failed. In terms of the evolution of the law, the 
prosecution against them under the new Act promised to demonstrate the 
value of this new generation of corporate accountability that would succeed 
where the old common law had failed.   
It will be recalled that Section 1 of the 2007 Act renders the Company 
guilty if the way in which its activities were managed or organised (a) caused 
WKHYLFWLP¶VGHDWKDQGEDPRXQWHGWRDJURVVEUHDFKRIDUHOHYDQWGXW\RI
care owed by the company to the deceased. The demands of Section 1(3) 
require that, once this has been established, the Prosecution must prove that 
WKHZD\LQZKLFKWKHFRPSDQ\¶VDFWLYLWLHVZHUHPDQDJHGRURUJDQLVHGE\LWV
senior management was a substantial element in the breach of the relevant 
duty of care. 
Steven Berry, 45 years old, was employed as a maintenance worker at 
WKHFRPSDQ\¶V+\GHIDFWRU\ZKLFKPDGHVWHHOORFNHUVIRUVWRUDJHV\VWHPV
Parts ± but not all - of the roof of the factory building had been replaced in 
recent years leading up to the incident. At one end, an old part of the roof, 
consisting of roof panels made of translucent fibreglass, had needed repairs 
from time to time, and the Court heard evidence of holes being patched with 
strips of tape to stop rainwater leaking on to the works below.  The judge 
HPSKDWLFDOO\UHVLVWHGWKH3URVHFXWLRQ¶VVXJJHVWLRQWKDWWKHIDFWWKDWWKHURRI
needed repairing was, somehow, contributory to the defendant¶VJXLOWDQG
indeed, emphasised in his remarks that the case, rather,  was about whether 
the method RI FDUU\LQJRXW WKHPDLQWHQDQFHZDV FDXVDWLYHRI0U%HUU\¶V
death, and the criminal responsibility attaching to the company for that death 
occurring. All it did was to explain why Mr Berry had been there at the time; 
for he had made his way on to the roof of the building on the 29th May 2008 
in order to attend to the holes through which rainwater leaked onto the floor 
below.  
                                                          
3
 R v Cotswold Geotechnical (Holdings) Ltd [2011] ALL ER (D) 100 (May). 
 
4
 See R v Kite and OLL Ltd, Winchester Crown Court, 8 December 1994 (unreported). 
But Mr Berry was not trained as a roofer; the judge summed up the 
GHFHDVHG¶VGXWLHVDVWKDWRIDJHQHUDOPDLntenance man. He and another man, 
Mr Baines (who was not called as a witness) would carry out small repairs 
about the premises; but evidence was heard that, if they were in any doubt 
about their ability to carry them out, they were instructed to ask for 
independent outside contractors to attend.  
The Court further heard evidence that, while Mr Berry was aloft with 
all his weight upon the roof, a fibreglass rooflight became detached from 
some of its fixings, twisted, and he fell 13 metres to the floor below, 
suffering fatal injuries. 
 
The indictment originally contained five counts: 
 
Count 1, corporate manslaughter against Lion Steel contrary to Section 1 of 
the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, alleged that, 
on 29th May 2008, the defendant ³«being an organisation, namely a 
FRUSRUDWLRQ DQG EHFDXVH RI WKH ZD\ LQ ZKLFK WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQV¶ >VLF@
activities were managed or organised by its senior management, caused the 
GHDWKRI«6WHYHQ%HUU\E\IDLOLQJWRHQVXUHWKDWDVDIHV\VWHPRIZRUNZDV
in place in respect of work undertaken at roof height, which failure amounted 
to a gross breach of a relevant duty of care owed by it, to the deceased.´ 
 
Count 2 alleged common law manslaughter against three directors of the 
defendant company: Kevin Palliser, works manager at the Hyde factory; 
5LFKDUG :LOOLDPV ZRUNV PDQDJHU DW /6¶V RWKHU IDFWRU\ LQ &KHVWHU DQG
*UDKDP &RXSH WKH FRPSDQ\¶V ILQDQFLDO GLUHFWRU5 ,W ZDV WKH &URZQ¶V
contention that each was under a personal duty of care towards the 
FRPSDQ\¶VHPployee Mr Berry, and that he died as the result of what the 
Crown say was their gross negligence (the judge UDWKHUFODULILHGWKH&URZQ¶V
assertion as to the defendantV¶DOOHJHGJURVVEUHDFKRIWKHGXW\RIFDUHZKLFK
the Crown argued was owed by them as directors to him as an employee). 
Count 3 contained a statutory health and safety charge, alleging  that 
Lion Steel failed to discharge a duty pursuant to Section 2 of the Health and 
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 The case of R v Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171  established the precedent for the Jury to convict in a case of gross 
negligence manslaughter against an individual defendant if it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the 
defendant owed a duty of care to the deceased; that he was in breach of that duty; the breach of duty was 'a 
substantial' cause of death (as refined by R v O'Connor [1997] Crim LR p16 CA); and the breach was so grossly 
negligent that the accused can be deemed to have had such disregard for the life of the deceased that it should be 
seen as criminal and deserving of punishment by the state. 
 
6DIHW\ DW :RUN $FW  ³+6:$´6 ,W DOOHJHG WKDW DV 0U %HUU\¶V
employer, the company failed to ensure so far as was reasonably practicable 
the safety of employees working at height. 
Count 4 alleged that the three directors committed the offence of 
neglect, contrary to Section 37 of HSWA. It alleged that the failure by Lion 
Steel in Count 3 was attributable to their neglect7. 
Count 5 alleged against Lion Steel that there was a contravention of 
the Work at Height Regulations 20058 (and therefore an offence was alleged 
under Section 33 of HSWA) because no suitable and sufficient measures 
were taken to prevent, so far as was reasonably practicable, persons falling 
a distance likely to cause injury.  
At a preliminary hearing, Count 1 was severed from the main 
indictment, because of the critical need to distance proceedings under the 
2007 Act against the company from proceedings against the individual 
GLUHFWRUVXQGHUWKHFRPPRQODZ,QWKH-XGJH¶VZRUGV³it would have been 
difficult in the extreme to try it alongside the count of manslaughter against 
the three directors, for reasons connected with the fact that the Act is not 
retrospective.´ The key issue focused on the admissibility of evidence in 
Count 1, against the Company under the 2007 Act, but tending to address 
the guilt of the directors in Count 2, referring to conduct occurring before 
the commencement of the 2007 Act. Moreover, there could be no question 
of liability of the directors under the 2007 Act9. The judge ruled that a joint 
trial would have required directions to the jury ³of baffling complexity, 
which directions would probably have been ineffective.´  
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 It shall be the duty of every employer to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and 
wHOIDUHDWZRUNRIDOOKLVHPSOR\HHV«LQFOXGLQJDWKHSURYLVLRQDQGPDLQWHQDQFHRISODQWDQGV\VWHPVRI
ZRUN«FWKHSURYLVLRQRIVXFKLQIRUPDWLRQLQVWUXFWLRQWUDLQLQJDQGVXSHUYLVLRQDVLVQHFHVVDU\WRHQVXUHVR
far as is reasonably practicable, the hHDOWKDQGVDIHW\DWZRUNRIKLVHPSOR\HHV«GVRIDUDVLVUHDVRQDEO\
SUDFWLFDEOHDVUHJDUGVDQ\SODFHRIZRUNXQGHUWKHHPSOR\HU¶VFRQWUROWKHPDLQWHQDQFHRILWLQDFRQGLWLRQWKDW
is safe and without risks to health and the provision and maintenance of means of access to and egress from it 
that are safe and without such risks; (e)the provision and maintenance of a working environment for his 
employees that is, so far as is reasonably practicable, safe, without risks to health, and adequate as regards 
facilities and arrangements for their welfare at work. 
 
7
 Where an offence under any of the relevant statutory provisions committed by a body corporate is proved to 
have been committed with the consent or connivance of, or to have been attributable to any neglect on the part 
of, any director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body corporate or a person who was 
purporting to act in any such capacity, he as well as the body corporate shall be guilty of that offence and shall 
be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. 
 
8
 SI 2005 No. 735. 
 
9
 Section 18 expressly excludes secondary liability for the new offence, while para A1(a) of the Sentencing 
Council Guidelines is even more concise in stating that the offence can be committed only by organisations and 
not by individuals see Sentencing Council, 2010, Corporate Manslaughter & Health and Safety Offences 
Causing Death, Definitive Guideline, Sentencing Guidelines Council, London. 
 
The judge also stayed Count 5. There was subsequently no appeal 
against any of these rulings. The result was that a jury was sworn in to hear 
the trial of the three directors for manslaughter at common law and the 
statutory offence of neglect, and of Lion Steel for breach of the Health and 
Safety at Work Act - a statute demanding entirely different criteria to those 
for securing a conviction under the 2007 Act, involving, as it does, strict 
liability rather than depending on proof of negligence. The trial of the 
company under the 2007 Act in Count 1 would be heard subsequently. 
Once the trial was under way against the Directors, the Crown called 
its evidence on what had occurred, including the evidence it said showed 
gross negligence by the director defendants and which would also serve 
against the company.  At the end of the Prosecution case submissions were 
made on behalf of the directors; for the Crown, this is where the case started 
to unravel. 
In a criminal prosecution under English law, the Prosecution must 
establish that every element of the crime defined under the Statute has been 
proved beyond reasonable doubt by the weight of the evidence adduced by 
the Prosecution10. How persuasive the Jury finds the evidence is entirely up 
to them, of course11.  
At the end of the Prosecution case, if it is apparent that the evidence is 
insufficient to establish the elements of the crime, consisting of the mens rea 
and actus reus, required by the Statute, then it would be unsafe to direct the 
Jury to reach a verdict on the evidence, and a submission can be made to the 
judge by the Defence that there is no case to answer.  Submissions are made 
to the judge in the Jury's absence, for a consideration of the law is not within 
their remit12. All they need to know is the substantive law which makes a 
persuasive case on the evidence which they hear. If, having heard the 
'HIHQFH¶VVXEPLVVLRQDQGWKH3URVHFXWLRQ¶VUHSO\WKHMXGJHFRQFOXGHVWKDW
the Prosecution evidence, taken at its highest, is such that a jury properly 
directed could not properly convict on it, it is his duty to stop the case. In 
that situation the jury must be directed to return a verdict of not guilty13. 
That said, generally it is not open to the judge to rule that there is no 
case to answer due to insufficient evidence before the close of the 
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 It would be fair to qualify this only in so far as strict liability offences, such as those in the HSWA, demand 
merely that the Prosecution establish breach of health or safety provisions, which then places a reverse burden of 
proof on the defendant to show, on the balance of probabilities, that it had exercised due diligence. 
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 The author emphatically will not be tempted to discuss the jury process in the light of the case against Vicky 
Pryce in Southwark Crown Court in February 2013.  
 
12
 R v Falconer-Atlee [1974] 58 Cr App R 348 CA. 
 
13
 R v Galbraith (George Charles) [1981] 2 All ER 1060; [1981] 73 Cr App R 124; [1981] Crim L R 648. 
Prosecution case, so that the judge can draw an informed opinion for himself 
in addition to the arguments established by the Defence and the Prosecution 
reply.  
In R v Brown14 it was confirmed that if, at any time after the conclusion 
of the Prosecution case, the judge is satisfied that no jury, if properly 
directed, could convict, he has the power to withdraw the case from the Jury, 
but that this is a power to be sparingly exercised. That said, this is precisely 
what happened in the Trial against P & O Ferries for corporate manslaughter 
in the case of the Herald of Free Enterprise15. For those commentators baying 
for a conviction under the 2007 Act, this would be a disaster surpassed only 
by a not guilty verdict. 
On 2nd July 2012, the judge duly ruled that in the cases of two 
directors of LS (Messrs Williams and Coupe) there was no case to answer 
on the common law manslaughter count; and in the case of Mr Williams, 
also no case to answer on tKHFRXQWRIQHJOHFW,QWKH-XGJH¶VRSLQLRQWKH
case against them should never have been brought and he was minded to 
direct the jury to acquit them; interestingly, however, the combined effect of 
Section 1 and Section 18 of 2007 Act expressly exclude a dLUHFWRU¶VSHUVRQDO
liability for the new offence, whether on an individual basis or on the basis 
that they aided, abetted, counselled or procured it. 
As a result, any personal conviction or acquittal would have been on 
an indictment for manslaughter, and as such would have been immaterial to 
the company itself, save for the probative value of evidence that would have 
been admissible both under common law and the statute.  The judge did feel 
that the Prosecution had an arguable, albeit weak, case against the director 
Mr Coupe, but the merit of that case disappeared as the evidence in the case 
unfolded and there just remained a case on neglect. 
It is apparent that, in the light of this, the Prosecution and Defence 
negotiated a solution with acceptable pleas that would bring the Trial to a 
close before the case against LS was due to commence.  As a result of the 
negotiation, LS then pleaded guilty to the count alleging corporate 
manslaughter, and the Prosecution offered no evidence against the directors 
on the remaining counts.  
The personal priorities of the directors to eliminate the risk of 
conviction and imprisonment of manslaughter had been met, but the 
downstream consequence is that we are none the wiser, nor are we better 
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 R v Brown (Davina) [2002] 1 Cr App R 5 CA. 
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 R v P & O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd [1991] 93 Cr App R 72. 
 
informed as to whether the 2007 Act will succeed in its task of securing 
corporate accountability for manslaughter where its common law 
predecessor had failed.  The exercise was not entirely a waste of time, 
though. The judge made some notable observations which can be employed 
to clarify some key points in the prosecution of a company under the 2007 
Act.  
It will be recalled that Section 1 of the 2007 Act renders the Company 
guilty if the way in which its activities were managed or organised (a) caused 
WKHYLFWLP¶VGHDWKDQGEDPRXQWHGWo a gross breach of a relevant duty of 
care owed by the company to the deceased. The demands of Section 1(3) 
require that, once this had been established, the Prosecution must prove that 
WKHZD\LQZKLFKWKHFRPSDQ\¶VDFWLYLWLHVZHUHPDQDJHGRURUJDQLVHGEy its 
senior management was a substantial element in the breach of the relevant 
duty of care. 
The judge assessed the risk of a fall through the roof as an obvious 
RQHDQGKHIHOWWKDWWKHFRPSDQ\¶VPDQDJHPHQWWHDP- that is, those senior 
persons responsible for making decisions about how the whole or a 
substantial part of its activities are to be managed or organised, or the actual 
managing or organising of the whole or a substantial part of those activities, 
as provided in the Act16 - should have appreciated that. The judge accepted 
HYLGHQFH WKDW D +HDOWK DQG 6DIHW\ ([HFXWLYH µ+6(¶ LQVSHFWRU KDG
conducted an inspection in 2006 and cautioned LS that warning notices 
should be erected to keep persons away from fragile roofs; the inspector 
referred to HSE guidance and codes of practice warning of the danger of 
fragile roofs, and emphasised the need for proper supervision and training.  
The judge accepted evidence that LS had, in fact, responded to this 
risk by devising a safe system of work, intending to keep Mr Berry off the 
fragile areas; what he (the judge) felt it had not done was to train him 
properly, or to equip him or others with equipment, in the form of a harness 
and line, which would protect him should an accident occur. Without 
catwalks or barriers defining safe access routes, the judge concluded that 
there was nothing to discourage a workman from taking a short cut if he 
carelessly chose to do so, echoing the words of Mr Justice Bridge in a 
Judgment against the Blue Star Line when he observed 
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 S1(4). 
 
«LWLs not only the reasonable behaviour of employees which it is 
DQ HPSOR\HU¶V GXW\ WR DQWLFLSDWH LW PD\ LQFOXGH XQUHDVRQDEOH
behaviour.17 
 
Two questions need to be addressed in order to reach the core of the problem 
of establishing guilt in this case: 
 
1 Whether the system adequately managed the risk which was 
reasonably foreseeable that Mr Berry was working on and around the 
fragile roof with no precautions or training. 
2 If the management had failed for this reason, was the resultant breach 
so sufficiently gross as to amount to a crime?  
 
Much of the argument in the case crucially revolved around the 
admissibility of evidence which came into existence before the 2007 Act 
entered into force18; this was an issue which, however important to the case 
in question, would not probably be shared by cases in the future, so a review 
of this point is not undertaken in this discussion.  
7KHMXGJHGUHZDWWHQWLRQWRWKH$FW¶VUHOLDQFHRQWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI
the common law of negligence19, without dwelling on the old baggage that 
accompanies the application of civil liability to a criminal offence20.  
Whatever the argument on admissibility, the judge brought into sharp focus 
the key point that the Prosecution still had to meet the demands of Section 
1(3), which states that the company would only be guilty ³if the way in 
which its activities are managed or organised by its senior management is a 
substantial element in the breach21.´  This hurdle being cleared, the 
Prosecution would then have to show that the breach of the relevant duty of 
FDUHZRXOGKDYH WREH µJURVV¶GHILQHGEy Section 1(4) as conduct which 
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 Chalmers v Blue Star Line Ltd [1968] 1 Ll R 643. 
18
 Paradoxically, had the defendant been arraigned under the common law charge, the problem for the Prosecution 
would not have arisen, but such an option was not open to them, because Section 20 states that The common law 
offence of manslaughter by gross negligence is abolished in its application to corporations, and in any application 
it has to other organisations to which Section 1 applies.    
19
 Para 21 of the explanatory notes to the Act clarifies that Section 2(1) requires the duty of care to be one that is 
owed under the law of negligence. This will commonly be a duty owed at common law. 
20
 See Corporate Manslaughter: New Horizon of False Dawn?  for a detailed argument. 
21
 Section 1(3). 
³falls far below what can reasonably be expected of the organisation in the 
circumstances.´ 
The decision on what constitutes a gross breach of duty is a matter 
reserved for the Jury in every case, but Section 8 gives guidance on factors 
which the Jury should consider. This section states inter alia that 
 
 [t]he jury must consider whether the evidence shows that the 
organisation failed to comply with any health and safety 
legislation that relates to the alleged breach, and if so, (a) how 
serious that failure was and (b)how much of a risk of death it 
posed. 
 
Even given any perceived weakness in the Prosecution case arising out of 
the evidence pre-dating the Act, the judge expressed a leaning towards the 
interpretation in this case that  
 
a breach may be considered as gross in late April 2008 because 
(for example) it consisted of a failure at that time to act on 
knowledge gained long before. 
 
In fact, the much-heralded case of Lion Steel was preceded by a matter 
of weeks by a prosecution in Belfast Crown Court, when the Recorder of 
Belfast, His Honour Judge Burgess, sentenced J M W Farm Limited for the 
FRUSRUDWHPDQVODXJKWHURI5REHUW:LOVRQRQHRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VHPSOR\HHV
who, on the 15th November 2010, was washing the inside of a large metal 
bin which was positioned on the forks of a forklift truck. In a seemingly 
Heath-Robinson arrangement, such a method of cleaning was by no means 
unique for the positions of the forks on the usual truck corresponded with 
the position of the sleeves on the bin, giving an apparently safe foundation 
for the process; but this truck was not the normal one, having replaced it 
when the normal truck had gone for servicing a number of weeks earlier. As 
a result, the arrangement was now decidedly unstable and, with the 
inevitability of Greek tragedy, when he jumped on to the side of the bin it 
overbalanced and, when he fell to the ground, the bin fell on top of him, 
killing him.  
In this case, the defendant company also pleaded guilty and, so, the 
2007 Act was not tested before a Jury. Once again, though, we may hazard 
some analysis of the evidence as applied to the statutory provisions. The 
Court was told that the company was aware of such a danger, having carried 
out a risk assessment which included instructions for anyone operating the 
IRUNOLIWWUXFNEXWLWLVFOHDUIURPWKH-XGJH¶VUHPDUNVWKDWWKLVDVVHVVPHQW
had been made of the former truck; when it was replaced by the temporary 
truck, no assessment was made of the position of the forks on this truck 
relative to the sleeves on the bin. The judge commented that it would have 
been apparent to any operator that it would not be possible to take the 
necessary steps mitigate the foreseeable dangers; he added that it was of 
particular concern that the operation had been going on from when the 
replacement forklift truck was deployed, and that the incident was not an 
isolated event. The judge concluded with rather wearied words that, yet 
again, the Court was confronted with an incident where common sense would 
have shown that a simple, reasonable and effective solution would have been 
available to prevent this tragedy.22 
In both cases, the judges relied heavily on the guidelines published by 
the Sentencing Guidelines Council in February 201023. This gives us further 
assistance because of the commentary which necessarily defines the 
obligation on the Prosecution to prove each of the elements beyond 
reasonable doubt, within the statutory limitations establishing that the 
offence 
(a) can be committed only by organisations and not by individuals; 
(b) has as its root element a breach of a duty of care under the law of 
negligence; 
(c) requires that the breach be a gross breach; that is to say one where the 
conduct falls far below what can reasonably be expected of the organisation; 
(d) further requires that a substantial element in the breach is the way in 
ZKLFKWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VDFWLYLWLHVDUHPDQDJHGRURUJDQLVHGE\LWVVHQLRU
management; 
(e) is committed only where death is shown to have been caused by the gross 
breach of duty. 
In the JMW Farm case, the jXGJH UHFLWHG WKH&RXUW¶V IXQFWLRQ LQ D
slightly different way to that summarised by Judge Gilbart in LS, stating that 
the Court should firstly consider the seriousness of the offence by asking 
how foreseeable was serious injury; how far short of the applicable standard 
did the defendants fall; how common was a breach of this kind in the 
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 R v J M W Farm Limited, Belfast Crown Court, 8th May 2012 (currently unreported). For the Summary of 
Judgment See:  http://www.courtsni.gov.uk/en-
GB/Judicial%20Decisions/SummaryJudgments/Documents/Summary%20of%20judgment%20-
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 Indeed, in sentencing the defendant in such a case, the Court is obliged to follow any sentencing guidelines, 
unless the Court is satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so, pursuant to s125 of the 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009. 
organisation; and how far up the organisation the breach went. The Court 
was then required to consider both aggravating and mitigating factors. In this 
case the judge held that it was clearly foreseeable that the failure to address 
the hazard would lead to serious injury and indeed that the consequences 
could well be fatal; that the company had fallen far short of the standard 
expected in relation to such an operation; and that the operation was 
permitted to continue for some time. The judge added, however, that there 
was no evidence that this represented a systemic departure from good 
practice acrRVV WKHFRPSDQ\¶VRSHUDWLRQV7KLV LWVHOIZRXOG OHDGXV LQWR
some difficulty in reconciling the Judgment with the Act. The sentencing 
Guidelines Council particularly distinguishes guilt in corporate 
manslaughter cases from guilt in cases under the Health and Safety at Work 
Act 1974, 
 
because corporate manslaughter involves both a gross breach of 
duty of care and senior management failings as a substantial 
element in that breach, those cases will generally involve systemic 
failures; by contrast health and safety offences are committed 
whenever the defendant cannot show that it was not reasonably 
practicable to avoid a risk of injury or lack of safety; that may 
mean that the failing is at an operational rather than systemic level 
and can mean in some cases that there has been only a very limited 
falling below the standard of reasonable practicability24. 
 
As a result, we are left in rather a quandary: in the case against LS, the judge 
apparently had satisfied himself that there had been a systemic failure, which 
(had the trial proceeded) it would have been safe for the Jury to conclude 
that the breach was a significant (if not necessarily the only) cause of death 
and, hence, the essential elements of an offence under Section 1 of the 2007 
Act would be establisheG,IKRZHYHUZHDQDO\VHWKH-XGJH¶VFRQFOXVLRQLQ
JMW Farm, the rationale of his decision is equivocal; if there were no 
evidence of a systemic management failure, then it would not have been safe 
to leave the matter for the Jury to decide and a guilty verdict would be 
misconceived.  
According to research by Solicitors Pinsent Masons, the number of 
new corporate manslaughter cases opened by the Crown Prosecution Service 
rose from 45 in 2011 to 63 in 2012 ± an increase of 40 per cent, with 141 
corporate manslaughter cases opened since records began in 2009 and 56 
                                                          
24
 Para A(4). 
 
cases currently being investigated for prosecution25. In fairness, the CPS has 
not readily disclosed such statistical information on its website26, and one is 
left wondering when the next case will be revealed, and lead, one way or the 
other, to a more definitive conclusion on the ability of the 2007 Act to deliver 
what the common law offence of corporate manslaughter did not. 
 
 
Dr. Simon Daniels 
Southampton Solent University
                                                          
25
 http://www.pinsentmasons.com/en/media/press-releases/2013/new-corporate-manslaughter-cases-opened-by-
cps-up-40-in-20121/ 
 
26
 See: http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/corporate_manslaughter/ 
 
